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CHRIS BYRON
ABSTRACT: Marx’s theory of human nature has been frequently 
misinterpreted. Theorists argue that Marx saw human nature as 
fluid. Other theorists fail to see human nature’s necessary connec-
tion to Marx’s theory of alienation. The validity of Marx’s theory 
of human nature, and alienation, are contingent upon a mutual 
acceptance. One cannot fully defend Marx’s theory of alienation 
without accepting his theory of human nature, and vice versa. This 
necessary interconnection emerges from examination of Marx’s 
trans-historical views on human nature, when compared critically 
with mainstream theories of Marxian human nature. The key to 
understanding Marx’s theory of human nature entails a distinction 
between essence and essentialism, and their connection to a theory 
of expression. Marx is an essentialist in regard to human nature, 
but sees human essence as an ensemble of socio-historical rela-
tions. These particular relations shape human nature’s expression.
THE SCHOLARSHIP ON MARX’S THEORY of human nature is conflictual. The texts where Marx mentions human nature, human essence, essentialism, and uniquely human attributes 
have been accessible to scholars for over half a century, yet many 
readers of Marx have radically different interpretations of these texts. 
Some scholars argue that Marx’s theory of human nature is historical, 
and that human nature is different in different modes of production. 
This is one of the more popular readings of Marx, which I will call 
a historicist reading. Others (e.g., Althusser, 2006) believe there was 
* Thank you to the editors at Science & Society, and to Bruce Janz and Don Jones at the Uni-
versity of Central Florida, for helping me clarify my ideas. Earlier work of mine on this topic 
appeared in Byron, 2013.
376 SCIENCE & SOCIETY
an epistemological break that occurred between the young and the 
old Marx, and that the mature Marx rejected all essentialist theories. 
Finally, some argue that Marx’s theories of history and economics are 
not incongruent with a trans-historical (i.e., the same at all moments 
in history) theory of human nature, but that there is a dearth of schol-
arship on what exactly is trans-historical about human nature. I want 
to propose my own positive theory about what Marx thought human 
nature was. Theorists have positioned themselves in one of these three 
camps, but very few have actually attempted to spell out explicitly what 
Marx’s trans-historical view of human nature actually was. Even those 
that say Marx does not reject a theory of human nature (e.g., Geras, 
1983; Callinicos, 1984) have written almost nothing on what Marx’s 
theory of human nature actually is. The aim of this essay is to do just 
that, and then to show human nature’s essential relationship with 
Marx’s theory of alienation. In addition to arguing that Marx held a 
trans-historical view of human nature, I also aim to show that human 
nature is a necessary  condition for demonstrating that alienation does 
occur in capitalist society, and presumably any other society that sup-
presses the better parts of species-being.
My argument will be threefold. First, I will show that Marx held 
to a trans-historical view of human nature, and in so doing I will 
specify what that view positively entails. Second, I will show how 
Marx’s theory of alienation and human nature are interconnected, 
with the perversion of a trans-historical human nature serving as 
the necessary condition for the realization of alienation in capitalist 
society. Finally, I will argue that Marx’s trans-historical essentialism is 
not in contradiction with his views in the sixth Thesis on Feuerbach, 
that “the essence of man is no abstraction inherent in each single 
individual. In reality, it is the ensemble of the social relations” (in 
Engels, 2010, 82). Traditionally theories of essentialism combined 
with non-enduring essence are not seen as compatible. I do not 
think this incompatibility obtains for a dialectical thinker like Marx. 
I argue that recognizing the validity of this combined position allows 
us to see that while society conditions our historical essence, it is our 
essential human nature that is alienated. Moreover, our essential/
trans-historical human nature is a necessary foundation for historical 
alienation. In order to justify these three arguments, against previ-
ous interpretations of Marx’s theory of human nature, I will first 
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clarify the competing readings, and then offer a common-ground 
suggestion for readers to use in deciding which interpretation of 
Marx’s work is most prudent.
Competing Readings of “Human Nature”
Several camps have been established in the Marxism and human 
nature debate. Given these different camps it would be helpful to 
have a definition of human nature which is unifying. “Human nature” 
ought to be defined as an attribute of the human species that is 
uniquely/distinctly human. Therefore, hunger would not be an 
aspect of our distinctly human nature. Human nature can also be 
historicist or trans-historical. It may be the case that we have unique 
attributes that exist at all times in all moments of history (trans-
historical), or it may be the case that what is uniquely human is also 
correspondent to a particular mode of production (historicist). The 
proffered definition of human nature does not rule out any of these 
competing camps too hastily.
There is the Althusserian camp, which believes essentialist phi-
losophies and Marxian theories of human nature are something the 
mature Marx rejected. Any claims about a universal essence are primar-
ily ideological (Althusser, 2006, 49 87). The Althusserians could agree 
that human nature is what is uniquely human, and then argue that 
there is in fact nothing trans-historically unique about human beings 
in general. Instead history is a process without an essential subject, 
and so attempts to clarify and figure out what is uniquely human are 
confused at best, and ideological mistakes at worst.
Another camp is the one that claims that Marx’s theory of human 
nature is historicist (D’Amato, 2006, 18–34; Sayers, 1998, 3–14; Say-
ers, 2011, 78–101). Each individual has a human nature, but it is 
contingent upon time and place, and is subject to change. Individuals 
who occupy radically different places in history have different human 
natures. Again, members of this camp can accept my proffered defi-
nition and still use it to fortify their arguments; e.g., what is uniquely 
human is different for humans in slave society, feudalism, capitalism, 
and/or socialism, and human nature could even be different based on 
one’s class location within a mode of production. There is therefore 
no trans-historical human nature.
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Finally there is a camp of thinkers who argue that Marx did have 
a positive view of human nature, but what that positive view was has 
not been wholly fleshed out (Geras, 1983).
Many prominent Marx scholars have rejected a Marxian theory 
of human nature: “Tom Bottomore, Robert D. Cumming, Eugene 
Kamenka, Louis Althusser, Vernon Venable, Robert Tucker, Kate 
Soper, Colin Summer, and Sidney Hook; to name but a few” (Geras, 
1983, 49 51). One way to refute this claim is to show that throughout 
Marx’s life, in all his theoretical works, he held fast to an enduring 
theory of human nature. In analyzing his theoretical works we ought 
to remember that human nature is that quality that is distinctly  human. 
Distinctly human qualities are qualities that separate humans from 
non-human animals. Traits that we share  with other animals (e.g., thirst) 
are merely aspects of our animal nature, even if they sometimes take on a 
different form from other animals. Thus, any theoretical speculation 
that Marx makes regarding the uniqueness of humans has a use-value 
in interpreting his theory of human nature.
Marx’s Comments on Human Nature
Before undertaking a chronological examination of Marx’s quotes 
on human nature, it is necessary to state why this procedure is impor-
tant. Many of the authors that have discussed Marx and human nature 
have often held fast to a single quote or set of quotes, or have attempted 
to establish an ontological or epistemological break in Marx’s theory. 
My general aim here is to show that Marx actually maintained a view 
of human nature (as defined above as that which is uniquely human) 
from his earliest writings all the way through Capital.
Due to space, some of Marx’s excerpts on human nature will not 
be quoted; not all of his comments develop his theories of human 
nature and species-being in a new direction from the works preced-
ing and following it (e.g., On the Jewish Question). It is important to put 
forth Marx’s views in chronological order, so that one can see what is 
maintained in Marx’s philosophical development. Many philosophers, 
most often Althusserians, believe that the sixth Thesis on Feuerbach 
marks an epistemological break for Marx, negating his previous views 
of human nature. However, by reading Marx in chronological order, 
it can be shown that Marx made use of a theory of human nature 
even after the sixth Thesis. Thus, this supposed epistemological break 
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certainly did not prevent Marx from holding onto a concept of human 
nature. And even if an epistemological break of sorts did occur, a 
theory of human nature was maintained.
Marx’s 1844 Notes on James Mill were his first writings dealing with 
human nature. These notes mark the first development of his theory 
of species activity:
Species-activity and the species-spirit whose real, conscious and authentic 
existence consists in social activity and social enjoyment. Since the essence 
of man is the true community of man, men, by activating their own essence, 
produce, create this human community, this social being which is no ab-
stract, universal power standing over against the solitary individual, but is 
the essence of every individual, his own activity, his own life, his own spirit, 
his own wealth. (Marx, 1844, 265–6.)
Marx is saying here that the human essence is the ability to produce 
within a community in a way that serves the community and oneself. 
When camera obscura  productive relations (e.g., capitalism) begin to 
take effect, “our products are not united for each other by the bond 
of human nature ” (Marx 1844, 275):
Let us suppose that we had produced as human beings. In that event each of 
us would have doubly affirmed himself and his neighbor in his production. 
(1) In my production I would have objectified the specific character of my 
individuality and for that reason I would both have enjoyed the expression 
of my own individual life during my activity and also, in contemplating the 
object, I would experience an individual pleasure, I would experience my 
personality. . . . (2) In your use or enjoyment of my product I would have 
the immediate satisfaction and knowledge in my labor I had gratified a 
human need, i.e., that I had objectified human nature. . . . (3) . . . I would 
have directly confirmed and realized my authentic nature. . . . Our produc-
tion would be as many mirrors from which our natures would shine forth. 
This relation would be mutual: what applies to me would also apply to you. 
(Marx, 1844, 277–8.)
Marx believes that human nature and acts of production should 
not be wholly separated. Human beings have a natural disposition 
to produce products with spontaneous creativity, in a manner that 
is conducive to individual and social gratification. In producing a 
unique product, individuals affirm their uniqueness, and in distribut-
ing said product, they gratify others. And through that gratification 
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an individual can further gratify themselves. Simultaneously, the same 
producer depends upon the same relationship of unique production 
and exchange from someone else. Therefore what seems unique to 
them is in reality common to all human beings.
An example of this sort of unique productive behavior would 
be Ray Kurzweil’s blind reader. The blind reader is a technological 
device that allows blind people to read certain texts. This was a device 
intended for someone else, someone other than Ray Kurzweil, but 
one that he derived great satisfaction from creating (Ikenson, 2004, 
139–140). The ability to create products for other members of our 
species, which serves their needs (and not just our own), is part of 
what it is to be distinctly human, according to Marx. This trait is part 
of our human nature, since it is uniquely human.
Although the Notes on James Mill were written in Marx’s early 
philosophical development, there is little theoretical variance from 
this position later on. Marx’s Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 
1844 (EP Manuscripts) mark the next stage of working through his 
theory of — among other things — human nature.
In the essay on “Estranged Labor,” Marx argues that economic 
determinants (e.g., wages, capital, rent) pervert the best parts of 
human nature. Beginning with the affirmative statement of human 
nature, he writes (1844, 74): “Man is a species-being, not only because 
in practice and in theory he adopts the species as his object (his own 
as well as those of other things), but — and this is only another way 
of expressing it — also because he treats himself as the actual, living 
species; because he treats himself as a universal and therefore a free 
being.” Marx goes on to compare the similarities between humans 
and animals, but notes a distinction, namely that humanity’s “species 
character” is productive life “in the character of its life-activity” as 
free and conscious. That is, free production — production without 
anything but nature’s material constraints — is what distinguishes 
the activity of humans from that of other species. Whereas life-activity 
for the animals is identical to the animal essence, free man makes 
life-activity “the object of his will and of his consciousness.” This dis-
tinguishing aspect makes humanity a species-being. One sees their 
species as an object that their free production will consciously and 
freely take into account, thus confirming their kinship as a species-
being. The lexicon is different, and productive consciousness is added 
 ESSENCE AND ALIENATION 381
in as a universalizing aspect of humankind’s essence; nevertheless, the 
theme is congruent with Marx’s Notes on James Mill.
One could object that Marx is incorrect to view production as a 
uniquely human activity. Other animals engage in productive activity. 
However, Marx argues that animal production is strictly for immediate 
need(s), whereas humans produce “even when [they are] free from 
physical need and only truly [produce] in freedom therefrom.” Marx is 
strengthening his point that whereas the life-activity of animals is fixed, 
people’s life-activity when free is a confirmation of their species-being 
via their freedom to produce objects that transcend mere subsistence 
needs (Marx, 1844, 76). Ultimately, one’s freely produced product is 
the objective confirmation of their essence, and its reception in society 
is a fortiori objective confirmation of their species-being.
In 1845, Marx and Engels drafted their first book together: The 
Holy Family, or Critique of Critical Criticism, trying to develop “the sci-
ence of real men and their historical development” (Marx and Engels, 
1845, 8). They refer to human nature in this book. When their views 
on human nature are read in connection with their scientific goal, it 
is safe to infer that the two thinkers believed that they could develop 
a science of humans that included the notion of human nature. They 
utilize the notion of human nature when referring to alienation in 
capitalist society:
The propertied class and the class of the proletariat present the same human 
self-estrangement. . . . The class of the proletariat feels annihilated in es-
trangement; it sees in it its own powerlessness and the reality of an inhu-
man existence. It is . . . abasement, the indignation at that abasement, an 
indignation to which it is necessarily driven by the contradiction between 
its human nature  and its condition of life, which is the outright, resolute 
and comprehensive negation of that nature. (Marx and Engels, 1845a, 43; 
emphasis in original.)
They argue that the estrangement and degradation the laborer 
feels under capitalism is the antithesis of a flourishing human nature. 
Human nature is under capitalist labor relations. The importance of 
this passage is that Marx is developing his theory of human nature 
from his Notes on James Mill  by combining it with his earlier developed 
theory of alienation.
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The next text to consider humanity’s essence can be found in 
the “Theses on Feuerbach,” written in 1845. These were written on a 
single sheet of paper, never meant for publication (Engels, 1886, 8).
Critiquing Feuerbach’s Essence of Christianity and his views of man, 
Marx wrote:
Feuerbach resolves the religious essence into the human essence. But the 
human essence is no abstraction inherent in each single individual. In its 
reality it is the ensemble of the social relations. Feuerbach, who does not 
enter upon a criticism of this real essence, is consequently compelled: 1. 
to abstract from the historical process and to fix the religious sentiment 
as something by itself and to presuppose an abstract — isolated — human 
individual. 2. Essence, therefore, can be comprehended only as “genus,” as 
an internal, dumb generality which naturally unites the many individuals. 
(Marx, 1844, 423.)
This note is prima facie a refutation of the previous views held by Marx 
regarding human nature/essence, and is therefore often clung to by 
Althusserians.1 Yet this is the case only prima facie. For now the thesis 
is worth mentioning because it is possibly  a view of human nature. The 
concept of essence has taken on a new meaning in Marx’s work that 
should be distinguished from human nature. For many anti-essentialist 
Marxists, this is a point at which Marx’s concept of essence is devel-
oping into anti-humanism, i.e., a rejection of trans-historical human 
nature.
The next statement made by Marx regarding human nature can 
be found in The German Ideology, written in 1845–46. In The German 
Ideology Marx makes one statement regarding what is distinctly human:
Men can be distinguished from animals by consciousness, by religion or 
anything else you like. They themselves begin to distinguish themselves from 
animals as soon as they begin to produce their means of subsistence, a step 
which is conditioned by their physical organization. By producing their means 
of subsistence men are indirectly producing their actual material life. (Marx 
and Engels, 1845b, 42.)
Marx goes on to point out how the material world around people 
conditions what they can produce for subsistence. This part of the 
development of human nature is often cited by historicists. They see a 
1 Norman Geras compellingly disagrees; Geras, 1983.
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necessary and fluid relationship between our historical human nature 
and the changing of the external material world. Marx is making a 
general point though, that whereas a bird can only make a nest, and a 
bee can only make a hive, a human can build different types of homes 
in a diverse array of environments. Indeed, in order for one to begin 
to distinguish themselves via  abstract thought and religion, their 
essence must initially be objectified in production, which requires 
its own subjective abstract thought. As Marx argues, “the production 
of ideas, of conceptions, of consciousness, is at first directly interwo-
ven with the material activity and the material intercourse of men, 
the language of real life” (Marx and Engels, 1845b, 47). Initially this 
material activity is free and necessary production. Historically people 
are first and foremost producers. It is only later that they are religious 
and ideological.
Marx’s Capital  is the culmination of decades of research which 
astutely brings together a lot of his earlier works into a comprehensible 
system. Although Althusserian Marxists argue for an epistemological 
break in Marx’s work, and historicists argue for a fluid theory of human 
nature, there are passages about human nature in Capital that are con-
gruent with Marx’s previous views of human nature. For instance, in 
the beginning of Capital when Marx is distinguishing use value from 
exchange value, he states: “Labor, then, as the creator of use-values, 
as useful labor, is a condition of human existence which is independent of 
all forms of society; it is an eternal natural necessity which mediates the 
metabolism between man and nature, and therefore human life itself” 
(Marx, 1867, 133; emphasis added). The trans-historical aspect of 
this claim is important. For Marx use values are often historical. For 
instance, a blow gun has no use value for a pilot in Wisconsin, and an 
airplane would have no use value for a hunter–gatherer. What remains 
trans-historical, though, are humans’ creative laboring capacities and 
their need to labor. The degree to which people are creative in their 
labors is an attribute Marx believes is uniquely  human.
David Harvey points out that “in his earlier works Marx made 
much of the idea of a distinctly human ‘species being’. . . . This idea 
takes a backseat in the formulations of Capital, but it does occasionally 
exercise a shadowy influence” (Harvey, 2010, 112). Marx’s chapter 
on “The Labor Process” recalls earlier statements he made regarding 
the uniqueness of humanity’s labor — especially compared to other 
animals — and universal aspects of species-being (i.e., our uniquely 
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human trait). In the labor process, the human being “sets in motion 
the natural forces which belong to his body . . . in order to appropriate 
the materials of nature in a form adapted to his own needs. . . . he acts 
upon external nature and changes it, and in this way he simultane-
ously changes his own nature” (Marx, 1867, 283). Before proceeding, 
it is again important to note that prima facie this quote endorses the 
historicist reading, but only prima facie. Marx only states that the labor 
process changes our nature and not our human nature. Since he refers 
to our human nature at other points in the same work, this distinction 
should not be seen as arbitrary. The distinction is important, given 
the common-sense definition of human nature that is being used to 
assess these quotes. People’s nature  can change, i.e., they can switch 
from having a hunger for tomatoes to having a hunger for salmon, 
but their human nature  has not been necessarily impacted. Human 
nature is what is uniquely and particular human. Our nature  is what 
is generalizable about us, but not necessarily distinct from other ani-
mals. Marx follows the comment on our nature with a trans-historical 
comment on what is unique about the human labor process:
[Let us] presuppose labor in a form which it is an exclusively human charac-
teristic. A spider conducts operations that resemble those of a weaver, and 
a bee puts to shame many an architect in the construction of her cells. But 
what distinguishes the worst architect from the best of bees is this, that the architect 
raises his structure in imagination before he erects it in reality. At the end of every 
labour-process, we get a result that already existed in the imagination of the 
labourer at its commencement. He not only effects a change of form in the 
material on which he works, but he also realizes a purpose of his own that 
gives the law to his modus operandi, and to which he must subordinate his 
will. And this subordination is no mere momentary act. Besides the exertion 
of the bodily organs, the process demands that, during the whole operation, 
the workman’s will be steadily in consonance with his purpose. This means 
close attention. The less he is attracted by the nature of the work, and the 
mode in which it is carried on, and the less, therefore, he enjoys it as some-
thing which gives play to his bodily and mental powers, the more close his 
attention is forced to be. (Marx, 1867, 283–4; emphasis added.)
As Harvey argues, Marx is returning to his previous views, which 
can be found in The EP Manuscripts and the Notes on James Mill. Marx is 
indicating a dialectical relationship between the material world, ideas, 
and their fruition (or lack thereof ). Within the labor process, the 
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material world loosely conditions what we can creatively think about 
and subsequently produce. For instance, the ancient Greeks cannot 
creatively design and produce an igloo, nor can the Inuit creatively 
produce the Parthenon. The actual act of ingenious fathoming is part 
of the creative element that distinguishes humans from other animals. It is 
in Capital  that Marx reaffirmed this theory that human nature entails 
people’s free and conscious productive capacity.
Marx makes one more reference to human nature in Capital, 
Volume I, in a chapter on the “labor fund” and the transformation of 
surplus value into capital. In a footnote critiquing Jeremy Bentham, 
he states:
The principle of utility was no discovery of Bentham. He simply reproduced 
in his dull way what Helvétius and other Frenchmen had said with spirit 
in the 18th century. To know what is useful for a dog, one must study dog-
nature. This nature itself is not to be deduced from the principle of utility. 
Applying this to man, he that would criticize all human acts, movements, 
relations, etc., by the principle of utility, must first deal with human nature in 
general, and then with human nature as modified in each historical epoch. 
(Marx, 1867, 758.)
Marx argues that Bentham is representing humankind’s relation-
ship to philosophical thought categories as they appear in the present 
historical moment, not trans-historically. Historicists are guilty of a 
similar mistake. Utilitarianism is an imprudent way of improving the 
welfare of human beings, when it fails to consider that the capitalist 
mode of production is a camera obscura of human nature. No matter 
how utilitarian we make capitalism, human nature is not in conformity 
with the capitalistic labor process. Marx posits that the Utilitarians 
never consider “human nature in general,” which would alert them 
to the harmful nature of capitalistic Utilitarianism.
Marx’s comments on human nature found in the Grundrisse, Vol-
ume III of Capital, and Theories of Surplus Value  are not divergent. When 
Marx’s views on labor, species-being, human essence, and human 
nature are analyzed together, we come across some very consistent 
themes of what distinguishes humans from other animals. People 
can produce with ingenuity and should produce for free expression. 
Individuals’ free and conscious production serves to gratify themselves 
and their fellow humans, and in so doing confirms what is distinctively 
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human. This is Marx’s view of human nature. It is a view of human 
nature because it is a view about what is unique to the human species. 
Marx believes this unique laboring capacity of humans “is a condition 
of human existence which is independent of all forms of society; it is 
an eternal natural necessity which mediates the metabolism between 
man and nature, and therefore human life itself” (Marx, 1867, 133).
Alienation as Perversion of Human Nature
I will argue that a trans-historicist reading of Marx’s theory of 
human nature allows for a strengthening of Marx’s theory of alien-
ation. Whereas a historicist would be hard pressed to say just what 
exactly is being alienated (if not human nature, then what?), and an 
Althusserian is forced to choose between two Marxist epistemologies 
(a false disjunction), a trans-historical reading has the benefit of for-
tifying the theory of alienation and being consistent with the totality 
of Marx’s theoretical works.
In his essay on Estranged Labor, Marx argues that political econo-
mists do not study the economy from the point of view of labor. This 
oversight hides the alienating circumstances of production. For the 
capitalists, labor produces unprecedented luxury. For the laborer, 
labor produces privation, deformity, idiocy, and a cog-like existence 
(Marx, 1844, 71).
There are four specific components of Marx’s theory of alienation. 
Alienation begins in the act of production. Marx (1844, 72) says that 
“the product is after all but the summary of the activity of production. 
If then the product of labor is alienation, production itself must be 
active alienation, the alienation of activity, the activity of alienation.”
The second component for alienation to obtain is that production 
cannot be under the laborer’s control. Capitalists and capital control 
the worker’s productive life. The worker does not get to exercise their 
intrinsic nature in work, but takes orders from the alien forces of the 
market and their capitalist exploiter. The evidence Marx posits as 
proof of this aspect of alienation is that people avoid work “like the 
plague” once they leave the workplace. If spontaneous work is the 
consummate fulfillment of human nature, people ought to revel in it; 
but by being denied the best parts of their human nature, they recoil 
from more labor. Since what is essentially human is now negated, 
people therefore only feel free and active in their “animal functions 
 ESSENCE AND ALIENATION 387
— eating, drinking, procreating. . . . what is animal becomes human 
and what is human becomes animal,” leading to “self-estrangement” 
(Marx, 1844, 72–3).
The third aspect of alienation is that individuals are alienated 
from their species-being. “In practice and in theory he adopts the 
species (his own as well as those of other things) as his object, but — 
and this is only another way of expressing it — also because he treats 
himself as the actual, living species; because he treats himself as a 
universal and therefore a free being” (Marx, 1844, 72–3). In capital-
ism, individuals no longer produce for their fellow species; this form 
of producing is foreign to them. One’s only reason for producing now 
is to satisfy their individual need for subsistence. In abstract political 
economy, and in the real world, workers now work for themselves as 
individuals, and not for their fellow humans. “Free, conscious activity,” 
as one’s characteristic form of labor, is nonexistent; labor is coerced, 
and since it is performed in a perfunctory manner, it ceases to be 
“conscious activity.”
The fourth aspect of alienation is a direct corollary of the previous 
problems. If one is alienated from their species-being, they are conse-
quently alienated from their fellow species, i.e., other humans. Marx 
(1844, 77) points out that, if “that man’s species nature is estranged 
[alienated] from” him, then it necessarily follows that he is estranged 
from other men, as all men share the same “essential nature.” And 
that essential nature is to produce as a species-being.
Marx sees alienated labor as a unique historical moment predi-
cated upon specific social and material productive conditions. Alien-
ated labor is not insurmountable, nor is it a necessary condition for 
social production. Historicists are right to point this out. Marx believes 
the act of producing one’s product for one’s fellow humans, of one’s 
own free and conscious volition, is an objective measurement of the 
consummation of one’s fulfilled life activity. If humans are a species-
being, they can return to free production through class struggle. Marx 
retained this adamant view that humanity was not always alienated 
into his late years. Thus, he states in the Grundrisse:
What requires explanation is not unity  of living and active human beings with 
the natural, inorganic conditions of their exchange of matter with nature, 
and therefore their appropriation of nature; nor, of course, is this the result 
of an historical process. What we must explain is the separation  between these 
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inorganic conditions of human existence and this active being, a separation 
which is posited in its complete form only in the relationship between wage 
labour and capital. (Marx, 1857.)
It is the disunity of humans from their natural way of life that is fully 
consummated under capitalism.
In his essay on “Estranged Labor,” Marx is taking the catego-
ries of political economy and negating them against his theory of 
species-being, i.e., that aspect of our nature which is distinctly human. 
Thus, Marx is not seeing people as a mere social product devoid 
of trans-historical qualities (i.e., he is not seeing humanity as a his-
toricist Marxist would). If people were strictly social products, then 
there would be nothing enduring or stable to rebuff political economy 
against, because socio-political-economic relations would reflect the 
fluid nature of human beings. If one’s essence is just a reflection of their 
social being, then there is nothing for their essence to be alienated from. 
Enduring (i.e., trans-historical) human nature is thus a necessary con-
dition for alienation.
I argue that human nature plays a necessary role in the Marxian 
theory of alienation. Marx argues that humans are alienated from the 
products of their labor, the act of production, their species-being, and 
their fellow humans. When one is alienated from their species-being, 
they are subsequently alienated from themselves. All four moments 
in the productive process lead to the obtaining of alienation. How-
ever, an enduring theory of human nature is necessary for a theory 
of historical alienation.
Marx’s theory of alienation is contradictory if one believes that he 
holds no view of human nature. Moreover, human nature can serve 
as the backbone by which to critique capitalism. I see three reasons 
why this is true.
First, to posit that people are alienated from their species-being, 
is to posit that there is a trans-historical nature of humankind. If 
one’s essence is nothing but the totality of one’s social relations, as 
a historicist would argue, then one cannot possibly be alienated, as 
there’s no enduring thing to be alienated from. Simply put, if Marx is not 
an essentialist, and believes there is nothing at root enduring in the 
human being, then the logical consequence of this view is that Marx 
believes individuals to be an absolute product of social condition-
ing. There is no dialectical relationship between human nature and 
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nurture which takes on different forms at different points in history. 
Individuals are strictly a mirror of their entire social ensemble. Thus, 
instead of being alienated from human nature, as Marx states, one 
can only be a unique product of their social environment. There is no 
enduring state of humanity on which to weigh the claim that people 
are alienated from themselves; and yet Marx makes this very claim.
The second reason why human nature is a necessary condition in 
Marx’s theory of alienation, is found in Marx’s argument that people 
are alienated from their fellow humans. If one loses the life activity 
of species-being, Marx explicitly concludes that they will be alienated 
from other humans, because this activity is in conformity with all 
humankind’s essential nature. This means that if one were to again 
produce in a species-being fashion, then it would be in harmony with 
their essential nature. This leads to the subsequent conclusion that 
whether one is living under communism, or alienated capitalism, their 
essential nature is enduring. What is changing is how this enduring aspect 
of human nature gets expressed.
Third, individuals are alienated from the product and the activity 
of production. People produce products of alienation in a capitalist 
society. Since Marx believes this alienated activity is not a necessary 
condition for human production, he must believe there is an alterna-
tive (i.e., socialism). Moreover, Marx argues that this alienated pro-
ductive activity is leading to an animal-like existence, where what is 
specifically human is lost. All that is left is fulfillment of one’s animal 
function (pleasure). At issue here is human productive expression, 
as distinct  from our animal function. What does it mean to produce 
in a uniquely human way?
Human nature is that part of our nature which is unique to our 
species. Marx argues that free and conscious production, which 
expresses our species-being nature, is a uniquely human capacity. 
Alienation during productive activity denies humans an essential 
expression of their human nature. This denial perverts our human 
nature, leading us to only express our animal functions. To argue that 
people are presently alienated  from their products, productive activity, 
species-being, and fellow humans, is to heavily suggest  that what is 
presently estranged need not always be estranged. Indeed, for humans 
to realize the best of their inner nature, they ought to maintain a 
positive view of human nature; one that goes beyond our present 
particular form of alienation.
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The Sixth Thesis — Essence and Essentialism
Detractors of a positive theory of Marxian human nature often 
point to the sixth “Thesis on Feuerbach.” A cursory reading of the 
thesis suggests Marx was a historicist, or conducting an epistemological 
break (a la Althusser). Indeed, John Bellamy Foster, quoting from The 
Poverty of Philosophy  along with the sixth Thesis, concludes that “reject-
ing all essentialism (apart from the practical, transformative nature 
of humanity itself, as Homo Faber),” Marx gave us his sixth Thesis. “In 
other words, human beings did not consist of some fixed human nature 
residing in each individual, but rather, as he was to argue later, all 
history was nothing but the development (that is, self-development) 
of human nature through social intercourse” (Foster, 2000, 113). I 
argue that this reading is incorrect. If it were correct, we would have 
to give up on Marx’s theory of alienation.
The sixth Thesis is:
Feuerbach resolves the religious essence into the human essence. But the 
human essence is no abstraction inherent in each single individual. In its 
reality it is the ensemble of the social relations. Feuerbach, who does not 
enter upon a criticism of this real essence, is consequently compelled:
1. To abstract from the historical process and to fix the religious senti-
ment as something by itself and to presuppose an abstract — isolated — 
human individual.
2. Essence, therefore, can be comprehended only as “genus,” as an 
internal, dumb generality which naturally unites the many individuals. (In 
Engels, 1886, 82.)2
If essence is “no abstraction inherent in each single individual 
[but] in . . . reality . . . the ensemble of the social relations,” we must 
jettison the theory of alienation, because enduring human nature 
is a necessary condition for the existence of alienation. And accord-
ing to a certain reading of the sixth Thesis, there is not an enduring 
human nature.
Seemingly there is a contradiction between this Thesis, and 
Marx’s later theoretical writings quoted above. However, Marx can 
2 Normal Geras, in Marx and Human Nature, provides several analytically keen arguments 
against a historicist and Althusserian reading of the sixth Thesis. I will not reiterate those 
criticisms.
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be defended from the appearance of contradiction by ironically 
getting at the essence of what he means by essence. There is no nec-
essary contradiction in accepting both the sixth Thesis and Marx’s 
latter claims.
A contradictory reading can be avoided if Marx is read as being an 
essentialist who sees an overall essence, i.e., the totality of human essence, 
as fluctuating in human beings. What is essential to humans, i.e., their 
species-being, is their creative and complex productive capacities that 
are capable of serving the needs of others. When their species-being is 
perverted they are alienated. In one sense Foster is right that humans 
are Homo Faber, but the way in which humans express their enduring 
human nature — fully, freely, and mostly consciously — is to be Homo 
Faber in a way that confirms species-being; contra Foster’s view. Alex 
Callinicos (1984, 70), affirms this reading: “Under capitalist society, 
the worker is compelled to sell his strength and his skill to the capital-
ist. As a result he controls neither the products of his labor, nor his 
labor itself. What should be his life-activity, through which he affirms 
his humanity, or ‘species-being’, becomes a mere means to an end,” 
and becomes alienated from his “human nature.”
If this expression of human nature is what should qualify as part 
of what it is to be essentially human, then what should be made of the 
claim that Marx sees essence as always changing? For Marx, essence 
and essentialism are analytically distinct, but practically united. Essen-
tialism is a necessary condition in how we are to view people’s total 
historical essence. Essence is to be understood as human being’s adap-
tation to their material circumstances, which are regionally unique and 
historically changing, i.e., “the ensemble of the social relations.” If we 
see essentialism’s expression, against a social backdrop or ensemble, 
then these numerous phrases concerning individuals “developing” 
and “transforming” their “nature” can be synthesized. Human being’s 
essentialism — that part of them that is enduring, i.e., their human 
nature — is expressed differently in different social settings. However, 
our human nature is not expressed differently because it itself is dif-
ferent, but because circumstances, social relations, material factors, 
etc., are different.
The overlooked element in the debate about Marx’s work and 
human nature is the notion of expression. How human nature is 
expressed in a particular socio-economic environment is going to be a 
part of the total essence of man. Human nature is a necessary condition 
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for having a broader essence.3 No matter what mode of production we 
find humans in, their human nature remains an essential component 
of their capabilities and needs; but its expression can be alienated, 
mitigated, or flourishing. When analyzing the essence of someone, 
we must consider the expression  of their human nature in conjunction 
with the socio-economic particularities of a given historical moment.
Instead of seeing Marx as conducting some kind of epistemologi-
cal break, or changing his mind about human nature and essence, 
we should see him as developing a new theory of essence in general. 
One of the final chapters in Volume III of Capital  confirms why we 
should fight for an economic mode of production that allows our 
human nature to flourish:
In fact, the realm of freedom actually begins only where labor which is de-
termined by necessity and mundane considerations ceases; thus in the very 
nature of things it lies beyond the sphere of actual material production. 
Just as the savage must wrestle with Nature to satisfy his wants, to maintain 
and reproduce life, so must civilized man, and he must do so in all social 
formations and under all possible modes of production. With his develop-
ment this realm of physical necessity expands as a result of his wants; but, 
at the same time, the forces of production which satisfy these wants also 
increase. Freedom in this field can only consist in socialized man, the as-
sociated producers, rationally regulating their interchange with Nature, 
bringing it under their common control, instead of being ruled by it as by 
the blind forces of Nature; and achieving this with the least expenditure of energy 
and under conditions most favorable to, and worthy of, their human nature. (Marx, 
1894, 959; emphasis added.)
Concluding Remarks
For anyone who wants to maintain Marx’s theory of alienation, the 
third moment of alienation (alienation of the species-being) needs to 
be reconciled with his theory of human nature and essence. His trans-
historicist views of human nature, combined with historical expression, 
can offer this reconciliation. Furthermore, we need to address the issue 
of people’s essence under capitalism and recognize that although it is 
completely perverted, exploited, and alienated, this essence of crippled 
3 This could be true even if one does not have a positive view of what human nature actually 
is. However, Marx does have a positive view, as outlined above.
 ESSENCE AND ALIENATION 393
humanity is not what makes us essentially human. Indeed, it is certainly 
not what separates us from other animals. As Marx notes, alienation 
is often an expression of our animal function. If we recognize human 
nature as our essential component and social relations as part of our 
historical essence, we solve the apparent riddle both in the contradic-
tion of alienation and the contradiction of Marx’s sixth Thesis. Finally, 
for those committed to critically changing society, if we can establish 
the scientific veracity of Marx’s theory of human nature and alienation, 
then we have a vantage point from which we can consistently and 
objectively critique any unsatisfactory mode of production. If creative 
and social production is the hallmark of our human nature, and the 
flourishing of our nature is good, then it follows that any society that 
perverts our human nature is in need of transformation.
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